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Abstract This paper seeks to understand why multinationals prefer to launch a label spe-
ciWc to their own product and examines how reliable these product-speciWc eco-labels are.
A new methodology is applied to assess the extent to which eco-labels live up to claims
about their contribution to conservation and the sustainable use of agricultural biodiversity.
Product-speciWc eco-labels are considered as industry self-regulation and all three regula-
tory stages are studied: the planning, implementation and outcome stage. There are major
diVerences between the product speciWc eco-labels in the degree in which agrobiodiversity
management is part of the normative labeling schemes. Although there are some problems
of reliability, such as transparency in the implementation stage and the monitoring in
the outcome stage, the degree of reliability of product-speciWc labels is comparable with
eco-labels of international labeling families. The conclusion is that only one of the product-
speciWc eco-labels examined here is reliable when examined in the light of all three stages.
The main reason why multinationals establish a product-speciWc eco-label instead of adopt-
ing one from an existing labeling family is that they want to proWle themselves as distinct
from other companies. The unique character of a product-speciWc label creates a market
opportunity for them.
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With regard to agricultural biodiversity, the government in the Netherlands has deWned a
policy of ‘stimulation instead of regulation’ (Parliamentary Report II 2004/2005).
Although the loss of agrobiodiversity is a relatively complex environmental problem, this
government considers (stimulated) self-regulation of private actors as more obvious prob-
lem-solving, than command and control regulation. As we know, government stimulation
of the private sector through subsidies for the sake of conservation or sustainable use does
not necessarily lead to the desired eVects, even when the rules are diligently followed (e.g.,
CBD 2001; Kleijn et al. 2001; Mayer and Tikka 2006). It is thus important to Wnd out if
there are other strategies that could potentially be eVective. One of those possible strategies
is regulation through the market.
An eco-label is a typical market instrument of food suppliers, which is found on a great
many products in the Netherlands and other countries. Its purpose is to reduce the informa-
tion asymmetry between the buyer and seller by providing information to a customer who
takes an item’s environmental performance into account when acquiring it (Gunningham
and Grabosky 1998). Essentially, an eco-label attests to the producer’s claim that the prod-
uct has certain environmental qualities (De Boer 2003). Thus, an eco-label is a policy
instrument that is intended to increase transparency in the market (Erskine and Collins
1997; Galarraga Gallastegui 2002). Environmental friendliness is a credence good. This
means that the consumer cannot discern whether the producer’s claim is based on facts or
falsehoods. The purchaser can see, smell, touch, or taste the product but still cannot deter-
mine whether it really was produced in an environmentally friendly way (Loureiro et al.
2002; Nadaï 1999).
An eco-label is a form of self-regulation in industry for the public good. The literature
gives ample evidence that self-regulation does not always have the intended eVects. In the
case of eco-labels, three explanations are usually given: eco-labels do not make the market
transparent; eco-labels scarcely inXuence consumer behavior; and eco-labels have no inXu-
ence on manufacturers (e.g., Erskine and Collins 1997; Nunes and Riyanto 2005; Leire and
Thidell 2004; Karl and Orwat 2000).
One reason why eco-labels do not make the market more transparent is that the consum-
ers do not have suYcient knowledge. Too few consumers have ever heard of eco-labels
(Erskine and Collins 1997; De Boer 1997, 2003, Nilsson et al. 2004). Furthermore, con-
sumers are not well enough informed about what eco-labels represent and thus about the
environmental beneWts they stand for (De Waart and Spruyt 2001; CCA 2004; Nilsson
et al. 2004). Moreover, it is not easy for a labeling organization to provide clear informa-
tion about the content of an eco-label, especially when the labeling scheme applies many
diVerent criteria (Brom 2000; Nunes and Riyanto 2005). That said, Leire and Thidell
(2004) conclude that consumers make too little use of the available information. Then too,
an abundance of eco-labels can cause confusion and thus disrupt the market. Nunes
and Riyanto (2005) mention the Netherlands as an example of a country with too many
eco-labels. Thørgenson (2000) identiWes the problem as information overload, whereby
eco-labels become invisible to the consumer. As KirchhoV (2000) and the CCA (2004)
point out, confusion arises when many labels make roughly the same claims and are thus no
longer distinguishable from each other (Meeuwsen and Deneux 2002).
Another reason why eco-labels do not work as they should is that they apparently have a
limited inXuence on consumer behavior. The preferences for environmental friendliness
that the public indicates in surveys are not borne out in their actual shopping behavior
(Peattie 2000). Other considerations such as price, quality, and consumption patterns may1 C
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2004; De Boer 2003). To be fair, the public assumes that everything in the stores meets
minimum environmental standards (CCA 2004). At the same time, various investigations
indicate that consumers have no conWdence in the eco-labels or green information (Peattie
2000; Thørgenson 2000; De Boer 2003; Erskine and Collins 1997).
Finally, the actual eVect of eco-labels may be diVerent than intended due to the role of
the producers. Adherence to standards is the Achilles heel of self-regulation (e.g., Parker
2002; Gunningham and Rees 1997; Havinga 2006; King and Lenox 2000). Mechanisms to
enforce self-regulation by companies are scarce. As Karl and Orwat (2000) note, it is
tempting to call one’s product environmentally friendly, even though that claim cannot be
backed up. Peattie (2000) states that 60% of English advertising about sustainability is not
based on facts. In contrast, there are also producers that do carry out environmental self-
regulation but deliberately refrain from communicating this to the public, perhaps because
environmental friendliness has a tree-hugging image among their target group (De Waart
and Spruyt 2001).
The disparity between the actual and the intended eVect of eco-labels raises questions
about their reliability. The reliability of eco-labels is an underexposed area in the research
literature; most research is focused on their eVectiveness or credibility. The focus of the
present study is precisely on that gap in knowledge. That is, it considers the capacity of a
selling party—a producer of foodstuVs—to provide a purchaser with proof and guarantees
that the labeling scheme of an eco-label is not only adhered to but also has a beneWcial
eVect on the environment.
Another aim of the present study is to Wll a second gap in knowledge. Frequently,
research is done on eco-labels belonging to an existing ‘international labeling family.’
International labeling families are the eco-labels organized according to a certain method
that appear in diVerent countries. An example of a labeling family are the organic labels,
such as EKO in the Netherlands, Agriculture Biologique in France, Biogarantie in
Belgium, Bio-Siegel, Bioland and Naturland in Germany, Soil Association in the UK and
the organic seal in the USA. Another example of an international labeling family are the
labels based on Life Cycle Analysis, standardized in ISO 14040, with family members as
European Eco-label in the EU, Milieukeur in the Netherlands, Nordic Swan in Scandinavia
and Blue Angel in Germany. In contrast, the present study focuses on product-speciWc eco-
labels that are placed on a market by a single multinational Wrm. The focus was narrowed to
the Dutch market because eco-labels are often country-speciWc. Multinationals were
selected in order to generalize from the Wndings of this study; the conclusions should be
applicable to other countries where these companies operate and market their products
under the same or a similar label. What makes these product-speciWc eco-labels interesting
is that precisely these labels are presumed to contribute to the information overload con-
fronting the public. This research seeks to answer two questions. First, how reliable are the
product-speciWc eco-labels of multinationals that claim to stimulate agrobiodiversity, oper-
ating on the Dutch foodstuVs market? Second, why do producers choose to put their ‘own’
eco-label on the market?
Analytical framework
For this study, we deWne reliability as the capacity of the party producing and selling food-
stuVs to provide both evidence and guarantees that the standards for agrobiodiversity set by
an eco-label are eVective. Hereby, we focus on a situation of information asymmetry1 C
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and distinguish three stages of regulation—planning, implementation, and outcome stage—
in an organizational process of regulation (Coglianese and Lazer 2003; Stoeckl 2004). Dur-
ing these stages, the following variables of reliability play a role: 
1. The agrobiodiversity performance standards that are incorporated in the labeling
schemes van eco-labels (planning stage);
2. The distribution of responsibilities and information by way of certain legal principles
of rule of law (planning stage and implementation stage);
3. Compliance with the standards set in the labeling scheme (implementation stage).
4. Measuring and monitoring the eVects of the labeling scheme (outcome stage).
The Wrst step is to analyze the standards couched in the charters of the eco-labels. With the
Agrobiodiversity Management Yardstick (AMY) as an aid, we compare how eco-labels
stimulate agrobiodiversity (Van Amstel et al. 2006). AMY is a classiWcation tool distin-
guishing ten types of farming activities. Placing the standards set forth in the labeling
schemes in these categories allows us to compare the schemes.
The second variable refers to the distribution of responsibilities and information among
parties in the product chain and with respect to consumers. On the grounds of the principles
of transparency (e.g., Gunningham and Rees 1997), separation of powers (Ogus 1995; De
GraaV 1998), and participation (Nilsson et al. 2004), the buyer is assured that information
is accessible and that there is a division of powers among diVerent regulatory and supervi-
sory authorities (OECD 2004). In that light, these three principles will be examined more
closely here (Van Schooten-van der Meer 1997).
The third variable of reliability is the compliance behavior of parties in the product
chain. We investigate how the risk of non-compliance is anticipated in the labeling
schemes of the eco-labels.
It is important to measure the eVectiveness of the labeling schemes, the fourth variable,
notably because they do not necessarily have any consequences for agrobiodiversity, even
when the standards have been met (Gunningham and Rees 1997; Kleijn et al. 2001). We
investigated whether companies measure the eVect of rules they themselves have imposed
and/or whether these results have implications for a revision of the labeling schemes.
Finally, we conducted interviews with experts to Wnd out why the producers prefer to
place their ‘own’ eco-label on the market instead of joining up with an existing labeling
family. The Wrst step in this investigation consisted of desk research. We studied diverse
documents such as annual reports, sustainability reports, newsletters, and fact sheets
(Bonduelle 2003a, b; CG year unknown, 2005, 2006; FLO 2001, 2005a, b, LMC 2003a, b,
2006; SAN year unknown, 2005a, b). In addition, we conducted 13 semi-structured expert
interviews. An expert was usually an employee of the multinational or someone from
another organization with links to the eco-label. The interviews were either recorded on
tape and then transcribed or, in a few cases, done in writing. Before processing the inter-
views, the texts were made anonymous.
Selection of cases
The original population of product-speciWc labels comprised some 20 labels. Several selec-
tion criteria were formulated to select the cases. The population was initially delimited by
requiring the label to be based on a scheme covering the production method. Thereby, cer-
tain labels were excluded: labels indicating that money is donated to a foundation; labels1 C
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packaging. The second delimitation, that the eco-label has to appear on the package, means
that the label could play a role in the consumer’s decision to buy the product. Third, the
label has to refer explicitly to environmental friendliness, as judged by the wording. We
looked for words such as organic, environmentally friendly, and green (Van der Meulen
2003). Having applied these criteria, we were left with the following labels (and the multi-
nationals they belong to): 
• Agrofair is a Dutch importer and distributor of tropical fruit, providing various Euro-
pean countries with fruit from South America and Africa. Agrofair sells the fruit by the
brand name Oké, so that the products also bear an Oké label.
• Albert Heijn is a Dutch supermarket chain with various house brands in its product line.
GreenWelds, one of its own brand names, has a label for beef and lamb products from
Ireland and Northern Ireland (UK).
• Bonduelle is a French producer of processed vegetables. The products are grown in
Europe and sold under the brand name Bonduelle. The label on the package bears a text
claiming ‘controlled environmentally friendly cultivation’ (in Dutch) which is a varia-
tion on the original French eco-label “Agriculture Raisonnée.”.
• Chiquita is a US importer of fruit that grows bananas in South America. Since September
2005, Chiquita has sold bananas bearing the sticker of the Rainforest Alliance (RFA).
• Jordan’s Cereals is an English company selling granola bars and fruit bars under the
brand name Jordan’s. Farmers from the United Kingdom provide the raw materials for
these products. A label printed on the package reads “Conservation Grade, Farming for
Wildlife” (CG)
Agrobiodiversity in labeling schemes
The Wrst criterion of reliability is whether the standards set by labeling schemes do in fact
stimulate agrobiodiversity. In an earlier study (Van Amstel et al. 2007), we designed an
AMY. Agrobiodiversity is a socio-political construct: the reason that this concept is deW-
ned, formulated and communicated is that some consider it of great importance to take
actions to maintain and conserve agro-ecosystems, species or genetic resources. This yard-
stick aims to connect the abstract concept agrobiodiversity with concrete on-farm actions, a
combination that we have called agrobiodiversity management.
Sartori (1991) gives a solution to avoid the pitfall of miscomparing when a concept with
a high level of abstraction is interpreted diVerently in dissimilar concrete regimes. Sartori’s
solution is called the ‘ladder of abstraction,’ which is the blueprint of AMY. The ladder of
abstraction is based on the idea of classiWcation and distinguishes several levels of abstrac-
tion. Few abstract categories have large intra-class variation, while many concrete catego-
ries have large inter-class variation. To design AMY we organized an expert workshop
with 12 ecological experts. They deWned agrobiodiversity management categories (both
designing their own categories and using existing categories of the CBD and a conference
organized by the Dutch Ministry of VROM 2005) and connected them in the ladder of
abstraction, as is shown in Fig. 1. On the fourth level of abstraction, they distinguished ten
categories of farming activities that are indicative of agrobiodiversity management in
accordance with eco-labels pertaining to the cultivation of crops in the Netherlands. On the
Wfth level, about 160 concrete agrobiodiversity performance measures were distinguished
in these 10 categories.1 C
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ences in standards we found among the eco-labels, comparing the about 160 management
measures with the labeling schemes. The labeling schemes of various products were stud-
ied: bananas (Oké and RFA), beef and lamb meat (GreenWelds), and cultivated crops (Agri-
culture Raisonnée and CG). Since AMY is developed for arable farming in the
Netherlands, we also included standards of eco-labels in our count that explicitly referred
to biodiversity. Especially category 3–10 showed large overlap in formulation and structure
with the eco-labels of international labeling families in the Netherlands, which are earlier
assessed by us (Van Amstel et al. 2006, 2007).
As Fig. 2 shows, the Wve labels purport to stimulate agrobiodiversity in diVerent ways.
Bonduelle focuses speciWcally on sustainable use (covered by the Wrst six types of farming
activities), whereas Jordan’s CG emphasizes the preservation of agrarian nature (the last
four types). Chiquita RFA and Agrofair Oké have measures for both the preservation and
the sustainable use of agrobiodiversity. There is a major diVerence in the amount of
Fig. 1 The AMY, the Wrst four levels of abstraction
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labels. AMY has the widest coverage under the label Agrofair Oké (eight types) and
Chiquita RFA (seven types). CG is the only label that has set quantitative standards for
agrobiodiversity. For instance, it stipulates that 10% of the farmland under the scheme
should be subject to habitat management.
In addition, we looked into the nature of the standards. Obligatory and optional
standards as well as recommendations may be found in labeling schemes. For instance, an
obligatory standard might contain the word ‘must,’ while an optional standard may state
‘there must be either ƒorƒ,’ and a recommendation may contain the wording ‘is advised.’
Compliance with recommendations is entirely voluntary (Fig. 3).
The Wve labels also diVer with respect to the force of their standards. All have obligatory
norms while most also have optional standards or recommendations. Even only including
obligatory standards, the leading position of CG is still undoubted.
Principles of rule of law
The literature on eco-labels gives guidance on reducing the information asymmetry
between the producer/seller and the buyer. There is some overlap between these principles
and those found in the literature of the philosophy of law concerning the protection of a
weak party from a strong one within an asymmetrical power relation. Van Schooten-van
der Meer (1997) selected three legal principles that are frequently cited in work on the
philosophy of law. In subsequent research, she then applied these principles to self-regulation:
Fig. 2 Amount of agrobiodiversity performance standards per product-speciWc label per category farming
activities. Numbers correspond with numbers in running text
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compliance with those standards, and the eVects of doing so are important. Transparency
can prevent non-compliance with self-regulation within the supply chain by ensuring that
parties have access to knowledge about the behavior of other chain parties (traceability).
On that basis, none can claim lack of information as an excuse (Gunningham and Rees
1997; Erskine and Collins 1997; Nilsson et al. 2004; Thøgersen 2000; De Boer 2003).
• The principle of the separation of powers. Independence, or the separation of powers,
prevents a conXict of interests (De GraaV 1998; Erskine and Collins 1997; KirchhoV
2000; Van der Valk and Van der Zeijden 2002). Separation of powers means a clearly
articulated division of responsibilities among diVerent supervisory, regulatory, enforce-
ment and executory authorities (OECD 2004).
• The principle of participation. Nilsson et al. (2004) point out that commitment by stake-
holders enhances the credibility of an eco-label. When parties formulate rules for them-
selves, they will be more inclined to comply with them (Gunningham and Rees 1997).
Drawing NGOs into the standardization process can increase public support for regulation.
These legal principles have been operationalized for eco-labels in terms of good gover-
nance. Regarding the principle of transparency, we investigated the extent to which the
information is transparent. Concerning the principle of the separation of powers we exam-
ined how the various responsibilities are distributed. With respect to participation, we
asked whether or not—and if so, which—parties in the product chain and NGOs are
involved in setting the standards for a labeling scheme.
Transparency
For all Wve eco-labels, we found that the producer provides general information about the eco-
label (see www.agrofair.nl, http://www.fairtrade.net, www.maxhavelaar.nl, www.ahgreen-
Welds.nl, www.bonduelle.nl and www.bonduelle.com, www.chiquita.nl, www.chiquita.com,
Fig. 3 The nature of standards of labeling schemes of the 5 product-speciWc eco-labels
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Biodivers Conserv (2007) 16:4109–4129 4117www.rainforest-alliance.org, http://www.conservationgrade.co.uk, www.Jordan’scereals.com,
all retrieved 21 July 2006). Moreover, we found that Agrofair and Chiquita have posted the
labeling schemes on their own websites. The labeling schemes of GreenWelds, Bonduelle
and CG may be obtained indirectly: for GreenWelds on the websites www.lmcni.com and
www.bordbia.ie; the labeling schemes of Bonduelle and CG are available upon request.
None of the eco-labels provide information on compliance with the labeling schemes.
That kind of information is considered conWdential. Furthermore, according to one intervie-
wee, the consumers have no interest in this information. All the consumer needs to know is
that compliance is monitored. The only one of these schemes that does give some insight
into monitoring of compliance is CG, which makes available the manuals used by the
inspectors.
The RFA provides general information on the environmental performance of the label.
The alliance has published research on this matter on its website (www.ra.org, retrieved 9
August 2006). CG has posted material on both the general eVects of the eco-label and the
eVects that have been measured on demonstration farms (www.conservationgrade.co.uk,
www.farmedenvironment.co.uk, both documents retrieved on 9 August 2006). The other
eco-labels do not give any information about environmental impact.
Separation of powers
KirchhoV (2000) diVerentiates exogenous from endogenous labels. Exogenous labels are
subject to control by an independent third party (certiWcation body), whereas endogenous
labels are self-formulated environmental claims. With the aid of the ‘certiWcation triangle’
of De GraaV (1998), as depicted in Fig. 4, we can analyze the structure of an exogenous
label.
Each of the bodies has a diVerent set of responsibilities. The standardization body
designs and develops the labeling scheme that the seller/producer has to comply with. The
certiWcation body audits and certiWes the seller. The accreditation body makes sure that the
certiWcation body is really independent, based on Guideline 65 of the International Organi-
zation for Standardization (ISO) and European Norms (EN) 45011. The continuous arrows
in Fig. 2 indicate a regulatory relation (contract), while the dotted arrows indicate a form of
interaction (label on a product, written communication, meetings, or participation). The
Fig. 4 CertiWcation triangle, based on De GraaV (1995)
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In some cases, a seller can be part of the standardization body or can advise the standardi-
zation body. Both the standardization body and the certiWcation body have to agree on how
to implement the standards. This dotted arrow indicates lines of coordination between the
standardization body and the certiWcation bodies. They need coordination when setting
standards and when making arrangements on how to inspect companies for compliance
with the norms.
If we were to draw a diagram depicting endogenous labels, it would be simpler in
design, since it would contain only two parties: a seller and a buyer. The seller himself
would then guarantee the buyer that the product is environmentally friendly.
Only one of the Wve product-speciWc eco-labels of the multinationals is an endogenous
label. It is Bonduelle’s agriculture raisonnée label. Here, the endogenous status means that
Bonduelle itself is in charge of the labeling scheme. Bonduelle contracts the farmers;
Bonduelle’s liaison oYcers monitor compliance by farmers; and Bonduelle takes care of
the label for the package.
The other four labels are exogenous. As it turns out, Agrofair’s Oké label is the same as
that of the Fairtrade labeling family, of which Max Havelaar is the labeling organization.
Oké does not add any content to the Fairtrade label. Underlying GreenWelds are the labeling
schemes of two organizations: the Livestock and Meat Commission (LMC) for the United
Kingdom; and Bord Bia for Ireland. The GreenWelds packaging does not bear the labels of
either of these organizations, so the links are invisible. The eco-label that Albert Heijn and
Jordan’s use on their products is also accredited. That is not the case for the eco-labels that
Agrofair and Chiquita use, though. Both Fairtrade and RFA are currently working on
becoming accredited labels in the future. With the exception of the Bonduelle label, the
four other labels are used by other companies outside the Dutch market. In the course of
our investigation, the RFA label was also adopted by another producer in the Netherlands.
Thus, labels that appear to be product-speciWc on one particular market are not necessarily
product-speciWc when more countries are taken into account.
Participation
Four of the Wve labeling schemes—the exception is Bonduelle—have been developed in
consultation with independent third parties. For two labels, namely Fairtrade and RFA, that
other party is the ISEAL Alliance (2006), and both labels endorse its Code of Practice. It
states, among other things, that the organizations setting the standards form a cross-section
of the relevant parties. They are representative in terms of the subject matter and the
geographical area where the standards apply. For three labels—namely Fairtrade, RFA, and
LMC—the schemes are also subjected to a round of public consultation in which anyone
can comment on the labeling scheme. This procedure is a bit less extensive for CG. The
standards of that scheme are set by a consultancy Wrm, the Farmed Environment Company.
Subsequently, the labeling scheme is submitted for approval to an independent committee
consisting of farmers, academics, and members of civil society organizations.
Comparison of the labels
These three principles—transparency, independence, and participation—underpin the orga-
nization and implementation of the labeling process of the four exogenous eco-labels. It is
important to them for the monitoring body to be objective. A common problem is that the
transparency has limits. General information and lists of standards are easily accessible1 C
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(i.e., on the outcome stage) is only available in incidental cases. Information on compliance
with the standards (the implementation stage) is scarce.
The only principle endorsed by the endogenous label is transparency. We found no indi-
cation of a separation of powers or of participation in the development of its labeling
scheme.
Compliance
Farmers’ compliance behavior cannot be investigated by conducting a literature study and
expert interviews. Basically, that is because these sources do not yield data on compliance.
For instance, they do not reveal priorities for enforcement, how many checks were made,
the kind of violations observed, or which sanctions were imposed. We have therefore nar-
rowed the range of our analysis. It is focused on the likelihood of compliance, in light of the
content of the labeling schemes. The methodology for this analysis is based on the ‘Table
of 11’ (Van Erp and Verberk 2003). The Table of 11 depicts 11 dimensions that play a role
in compliance by a target group. Each dimension is also associated with risks of non-
compliance (Table 1).
The Table of 11 distinguishes two dimensions of compliance, spontaneous and
enforced. Farmers who comply spontaneously follow the rules of self-regulation by their
own volition. Alternatively, they may follow the rules because they face inspections or
sanctions.
Spontaneous compliance
All of the eco-labels take measures to ensure that members of the target group (T1) are
acquainted with the rules. The most thorough of the four in this respect is LMC, the organi-
zation behind GreenWelds. LMC requires farmer to endorse the labeling scheme; by sign-
ing, they aYrm that they have read and understood the standards.
In addition, all of the eco-labels ensure that compliance will be advantageous to the farm-
ers (T2). For instance, farmers can sell their product above the market price. In this regard,
one interviewee saw room for improvement in CG, as price Xuctuations can sometimes wipe
Table 1 Risks non-compliance identiWed with the Table of 11
Risks of non-compliance for the dimensions of spontaneous compliance
1 Non-compliance by farmers due to unawareness of standards and lack of clarity in standards
2 Non-compliance is advantageous to farmers in terms of time, money, and trouble. The Wnancial 
barrier may be attributed to both the production method and the cost of certiWcation
3 Farmers consider standards of the eco-label to be unreasonable 
4 Farmers are not willing to conform to authority of SI/CI
5 Behavior of farmers is not sanctioned by unauthorized others (performing informal checks)
Risks of non-compliance for the enforcement dimensions
6 Little perceived chance that informally discovered violations will be reported to auditors (informal 
chance of being reported)
7 Little perceived chance of inspection after committing a violation (chance of control)
8 Little perceived chance of discovery of a violation upon inspection by auditor (chance of detection)
9 Little perceived chance of additional inspection after discovery of violation (chance of selection)
10 Little perceived chance of incurring sanction after discovery of a violation (chance of sanction)
11 Little harm by the sanctions and additional disadvantages of sanctioning (sanction type)1 C
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labeling scheme (FLO 2001). Farmers are guaranteed that Bonduelle and Albert Heijn will
buy their products; alternatively, they achieve higher levels of operational eYciency when
aYliated with RFA and Fairtrade.
Comparison of the eco-labels suggests some diVerence with respect to how reasonable
the standards are (T3) and how willing the farmer would be to comply with the authority
(T4). However, CG ranks highest on both points. Under this scheme, the farmers have to
write a motivation plan specifying individual targets for their own farm. Jordan’s then
selects its farmers on the basis of their plans.
Finally, there is greater chance of spontaneous compliance when the technicians doing
the monitoring are not oYcial inspectors (T5). Scientists and NGOs have conducted vari-
ous studies on the eco-labels. Recently, a French investigation was published that was crit-
ical of the results of Fairtrade (Jacquiau 2006). The results of research on Bonduelle show a
more diverse picture. An investigation by the environmental organization Milieudefensie
(Ende and Tielens 2006) gives Bonduelle a good report card, whereas the consumer organi-
zation called Goede Waar en Co is critical of the Bonduelle label (www.goedewaar.nl,
retrieved 23 August 2006). Two other labels, Jordan’s and Chiquita, were also scrutinized
by this consumer organization, while GreenWelds was assessed by the animal welfare soci-
ety (www.dierenbescherming.nl, retrieved 23 August 2006). Various investigations with
negative outcomes have been published on Chiquita (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit 2001; Gallaghar and McWhither 1998; Stein 2001; Swedish Society for
Nature Conservation 2005; Lustig 2004). The Wve dimensions of spontaneous compliance
are set forth in Table 2.
Enforcement
Each of the Wve labels has a regime for monitoring and imposing sanctions. According to
the interviewees, though, the labeling organizations do not always get the results of unoY-
cial inspections or, if they do, that knowledge does not always lead to adjustments (T6).
RFA and Fairtrade are the only ones that take comments about the farmers as grounds to
carry out extra inspections (SAN 2005a). Bonduelle uses the positive outcomes of research
as promotional material; the Wrm indicates that it disagrees with the negative outcomes in
publications. Albert Heijn discusses research Wndings with NGOs, but it is unclear whether
or not the discussion leads to action or improvement.
With respect to announced inspections (T7), the monitoring frequency for the four exog-
enous labels—once every 12 or 18 months—is low. With such a gap, a farmer could oper-
ate in a way that does not correspond with the labeling scheme. Then, when the time comes
for inspection, the farmer could show the auditor what he would like to see instead of the
real situation. Such evasive behavior is less likely for a number of requirements of CG and
RFA. Obviously, habitats and buVer zones are not established in a day. It is possible,
though, to conceal prohibited pesticides before the announced audit occurs. The monitoring
frequency for Bonduelle is unclear but seems to be higher than for the exogenous eco-
labels. Bonduelle has an agronomists services to provide the growers with guidance and
crop surveillance, in combination with monitoring in all stages of the production process.
This agronomist service has actually taken over some of the executive responsibilities that
traditionally belong to the grower. But the farmers have an extra incentive to comply. Not
only does the Wrm’s agronomist service pick up the bill for these inspections, but the Wrm
also selects the farmers with whom it wants to enter into a contract. Indeed, as the interviewee
from Bonduelle stated, only the very best farmers are oVered a contract.1 C
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tion (T8). They also have checklists and interpretation documents for the labeling schemes.
The method used by RFA is called triple checking. This means that the manager, employ-
ees, and documents are all checked at the same time. The four exogenous eco-labels also
conduct extra, unannounced inspections in the event that previous audits had turned up any
irregularities (T9).
Table 2 Spontaneous dimensions of compliance per eco-label
Eco-label Institutional guarantees for dimensions of spontaneous compliance
Agrofair—Oké (T1)—Some of the standards indicate how monitoring takes place
(T2) —Higher price and Wnancial bonus for products, so that the farmers do not 
go bankrupt; more eYcient farms, no charge for certiWcation, farmers are 
stockholders of Agrofair
(T3) —Voluntary scheme, civil society organizations are involved in setting 
standards
(T4) —Opportunities for control and obligations for rapportage are set forth in 
contract.
(T5) —Supply chain parties check on each other; Goede Waar en Co is posi-
tive, negative audit in French research 
Albert Heijn—GreenWelds (T1) —Farmer signs standards to aYrm understanding; newsletters and extra 
information; standards indicate how monitoring takes place
(T2) —Purchase guarantee, fair price for costs incurred, knowledge about con-
sumer preferences
(T3) —Voluntary scheme, market parties involved in setting standards
(T4) —Opportunities for control and obligations for rapportage are set forth in 
contract
(T5) —AH monitors itself, control of animal welfare moderately positive
Bonduelle—Controlled 
environmentally friendly 
cultivation
(T1) —Standards set forth in contract, explanation and consultation during con-
tract negotiations, cultivation surveillance by agricultural extension services
(T2) —Purchase guarantee
(T3) —Voluntary scheme
(T4) —Opportunities for control and obligations for rapportage are set forth in 
contract
(T5) —Research by Milieukeur (positive) and Goede Waar en Co (negative)
Chiquita—Rainforest 
alliance
(T1) —Training for farmers, extra explanation and technical support by certi-
fying body, newsletter Chiquita
(T2) —Higher price to compensate for costs, more eYcient farms, knowledge 
of consumer preferences
(T3) —Voluntary scheme, civil society organizations are involved in setting 
standards
(T4) —Opportunities for control and obligations for rapportage are set forth in 
contract
(T5) —CertiWed farmers monitor each other; Chiquita and RFA are subject to 
many investigations by third parties,:Goede Waar en Co positive: American 
investigations negative
Jordans—Conservation 
grade
(T1) —Training for farmers, extra explanation possible, technical support
(T2) —Farmers usually get a higher price, stronger competitive position for 
processors
(T3) —Voluntary scheme, farmers are selected on basis of their motivation, 
farmers are involved in setting standards
(T4) —Opportunities for control and obligations for rapportage are set forth in 
contract
(T5) —Negative assessment by Goede Waar en Co.1 C
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two eco-labels have a system of sanctions that describe precisely under which conditions a
particular measure would be imposed. SpeciWcally, these are CG and GreenWelds (CG
2005; LMC 2003a, b). But RFA and Fairtrade can also impose sanctions, namely by sus-
pending or decertifying the farmer (T11). Table 3 gives an overview of the enforcement
dimensions for each eco-label.
Comparison of the labels
We did not assess the extent of actual compliance due to a lack of information. One conclu-
sion we could draw is that all of the eco-labels have speciWed institutional guarantees to
reduce the chance of non-compliance. With respect to the dimensions of spontaneous com-
pliance, we found that eco-labels put most eVort into informing farmers of the standards
(T1) and the advantages of compliance (T2). In addition, we found that inspections are also
conducted by unoYcial bodies (T5). Both RFA and Fairtrade take these results as grounds
for holding extra inspections. For the rest of the labels, though, informal checks have little
impact on compliance. Yet this does not mean that such checks would have no eVect; they
could undermine the credibility and public acceptance of an eco-label.
With respect to the institutional dimensions, the emphasis is on increasing the chance
that a farmer will get caught (T8). The inspectors are trained and rotated, and inspection
rounds are scheduled systematically. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether these
eVorts come to naught because of the low frequency of inspections. At a frequency of once
or twice a year, fraud is an easy option for a farmer. Furthermore, the sanction policy is not
very strict. The farmer almost always gets the chance to Wx what was wrong. Alternatively,
together with the certiWcation body, the parties try to Wnd a way to attain the desired situa-
tion. Compared to the other eco-labels, Jordan’s has the most institutional guarantees.
Monitoring outcome stage
In this section, we discuss whether the environmental impact of an eco-label is monitored
and, if so, what comprises such an auditing system. Systematic measurements increase the
reliability of an eco-label.
The only label to systematically monitor environmental impact is CG. The Centre of
Hydrology and Ecology carries out annual surveys of the biodiversity present on two
demonstration farms (www.farmedenvironment.co.uk, retrieved 8 August 2006). These
Wndings are also used in the process of setting standards and revising the labeling scheme.
The scheme the RFA uses to monitor environmental impact is less extensive. Due to a
lack of funds, there is no systematic monitoring. Impact assessments are made at a small
scale, though, for instance by trainees. According to the interviewee from RFA, the organi-
zation is aware that they should improve monitoring, and they recently received a subsidy
to do so. Even so, the results will not be used as feedback in any eVorts to adapt the labeling
scheme. The reason is that RFA does not set any quantitative targets. Another organization,
Conservation International, was commissioned by Chiquita to conduct comparative
research on the eVects of RFA by studying two farms, one certiWed by RFA, the other not.
In light of the results, Chiquita decided to certify all of its own plantations.
No environmental impact studies are carried out by the GreenWelds and Oké labels;
Bonduelle has not provided any information on the subject. The results are summarized for
each eco-label in Table 4. One reason why the farmers contracted by these eco-labels are1 C
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Eco-label Institutional guarantees for enforcement dimensions (T6–T11)
Agrofair—Oké (T6) —Signals from supply chain parties about violations are investigated
(T7) —Annual audit; intention of audit depends on the risk of the production 
sector
(T8) —Interview farmers and control bookkeeping, annually trained auditors, 
no rotation
(T9) —Unannounced extra audits when signals on non-compliance are 
received
(T10) —Up to a year for remediation; afterwards, suspension or 
de-certiWcation
(T11) —Suspension upon non-compliance, de-certiWcation upon repeated 
non-compliance or a lengthy period without showing progress
Albert Heijn—GreenWelds (T6) —AH listens to the assessment of the label by the animal welfare group 
Dierenbescherming; own inspections have no consequences
(T7) —Annually announced control of bookkeeping, every 18 months an 
announced inspection of farm and livestock, annually possibly unannounced 
samples collected at 5–10% of the farms
(T8) —Accredited certiWer, trained auditors, rotation of inspectors
(T9) —Possibly selection of farms for extra inspection
(T10) —Month allowed for remediation, afterwards suspension, contract with 
AH rescinded
(T11) —Duration of suspension depends on kind of violation
Bonduelle—Controlled 
environmentally 
friendly 
cultivation
(T6) —Bonduelle uses positive assessment in promotional material
(T7) —Inspections by internal agrarian extension services, frequency unclear
(T8) —Control books and collect samples, no information on the auditors
(T9) —Possibly selection of farmers for extra inspections
(T10–T11) —Bonduelle is not required to buy products that do not meet the 
standards and can rescind the contract 
Chiquita—Rainforest 
alliance
(T6) —RFA responds to comments of farmers and complaints by other 
stakeholders
(T7) —Each year announced inspections
(T8) —Triple Checking System, rotation of auditors, trained auditors
(T9) —Unannounced extra inspections when complaints are received
(T10–T11) —For certiWcation, the farmer must meet 80% of all standards, 
50% of the standards for each principle, and 100% of the critical standards; 
when standards are not met, evaluation is made to determine if problem is 
systematic or temporary; period to resolve the problems between 6 months 
and 2 years; sanction consists of losing the certiWcate 
Jordans—Conservation 
grade
(T6) —No research results known at CG.
(T7) —Annually announced inspections for the general requirements; per year, 
20% of the farms inspected for habitat
(T8) —General requirements inspected by trained inspectors of accredited 
body on the basis of a speciWc auditing scheme; still no rotation of 
inspectors; inspection of habitats by independent ecologists on the basis of 
a speciWc auditing scheme
(T9) —Extra inspections if the habitats do not pass; so far, no need to 
re-inspect farm for general requirements
(T10–T11) —General requirements for system of minor and major problems 
that could lead to rescinding the contract with the processor; habitats that 
still do not pass after re-inspection also lead to rescinding the contract with 
the processor1 C
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eVects will logically follow. Thus, there will be no need to measure them. But there are
other reasons too: there might not be enough money, or the eVects might not be measurable.
However, both RFA and Fairtrade are working on ways to improve their monitoring
system. In the future, environmental impact might well be measured at Fairtrade.
Reasons to adopt a product-speciWc label
The second research question in the present study asks why Wrms choose to communicate
their environmental friendliness by means of a product-speciWc eco-label. To answer that
question, we Wrst consider the producers’ motivations. Then we discuss their opinions on
whether the introduction of yet another eco-label might confuse the consumers.
The interviewees motivate their choice of a label in two ways: with arguments in favor
of introducing their ‘own’ eco-label; and arguments against using eco-labels from existing
labeling families.
The most prevalent reason to use a product-speciWc eco-label is in order to distinguish a
particular product from other products. Bonduelle wants to use the label to let consumers
know that Bonduelle does something that the other Wrms do not. Similarly, Jordan’s uses the
CG label to distinguish itself from other companies. And Chiquita, after working with the
RFA for 14 years, has decided to let the consumers know of its link with this label in response
to the competition on the West European market. In this way, the public can tell a Chiquita
banana from other bananas. Agrofair has designed the Oké label to diVerentiate itself from
other producers aligned with Fairtrade. Yet there are other arguments in favor of an eco-label,
be it product-speciWc or part of a family. The reason why environmentally friendly products
yield higher proWts is that consumers are willing to pay more for a product that is sustainably
produced. And a company can advertise under its own eco-label to improve its image or cus-
tomer loyalty. Consider the case of Chiquita, which started to work with the RFA when the
amount of negative publicity on the company kept increasing. Jordan’s chose to sign on with
an eco-label that is concerned with biodiversity because, as consumer research has shown, the
British consumer is mainly interested in an eco-label that promotes wildlife.
A number of interviewees gave some reasons why a company would not choose to aYl-
iate with an existing label. First, an existing eco-label is not a distinguishing feature. This
concern is evident among the producers using the existing label Fairtrade. As a case in
point, Agrofair’s ‘own’ Oké logo presents the Fairtrade standards in a positive light. The
producer of Tony’s Chocolonely, in contrast, puts a diVerent slant on the Fairtrade stan-
dards: its ‘own’ label states that the product is ‘100% slave-free,’ as guaranteed by Max
Havelaar. Thus, while the claims of both companies are based on Fairtrade certiWcation, the
Oké and ‘Slave-free’ logos diVerentiate the two product lines. Second, it is said that existing
Table 4 Auditing environmental impact per eco-label
Eco-label Audit Frequency Feedback 
Agrofair—Oké No – –
Albert Heijn—GreenWelds No – –
Bonduelle—Controlled environmentally
friendly cultivation
No – –
Chiquita—RFA Yes Incidentally No, used in promotional material
Jordans—CG Yes Annually Yes, used to set standards 1 C
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not bear an eco-label. For instance, the interviewee from Bonduelle noted that by including
organic foods in Bonduelle’s product line, consumers might get the idea that ‘normal’
Bonduelle products are not environmentally friendly. One reason to decide against organic
production is that producers feel they could not possibly apply the large-scale industrial
methods that organic production would entail. Table 5 presents these concerns for each
eco-label.
Regarding the confusion that the diverse eco-labels create for the public, the most
important concern for producers with their own eco-labels, according to the interviewees, is
that the consumer should recognize the eco-label and have a positive response to it.
Whether or not the consumer is well informed about the meaning of the eco-label is consid-
ered less relevant. Thus, the producer is hardly concerned about whether its own eco-label
confuses the public or not. Actually, the producer has an interest in keeping the public from
being able to compare its own eco-label with other eco-labels. Indeed, the comparison
might not turn out well for the own label.
Conclusions
The aim of this study was to Wnd out whether or not product-speciWc eco-labels stimulation
agrobiodiversity are reliable and why producers prefer product-speciWc eco-labels. We
cannot demonstrate that any of the Wve eco-labels examined here should be considered reli-
able for all three stages of self-regulation. The missing evidence is particularly acute for the
implementation stage, in the absence of documentation on how the participants in the
ewco-label schemes have complied with the standards. In fact, for most of these eco-labels,
we could not demonstrate the impact on biodiversity either. There is usually not enough
money available to audit farmers’ performance, so the eVects on the environment are not
monitored but assumed.
Comparing the Wve eco-labels, the most reliable eco-label turns out to be CG, which has
also included quantitative agrobiodiversity standards in the labeling scheme. This eco-label
selects participants on the grounds of their motivation and the most far-reaching distribu-
tion of responsibilities among independent third parties. Moreover, it is the only one of the
eco-labels to annually carry out a systematic audit of performance and use the results as a
feedback loop when making adjustments in the labeling scheme.
Table 5 Reasons to prefer an eco-label of their own over an existing eco-label
Eco-label Reasons in favor of an own label Reasons against an existing label 
Agrofair—Oké DiVerentiation Does not diVerentiate 
Albert Heijn—GreenWelds Consumer preference, more proWt Evokes fear in consumer about 
normal product line
Bonduelle—Controlled 
environmentally friendly 
cultivation 
DiVerentiation, customer loyalty Evokes fear in consumer about 
normal product, organic label 
not feasible 
Chiquita—Rainforest Alliance DiVerentiation, RFA active on 
the subject and directed toward 
problem-solving 
Organic label not feasible, 
in the early 1990s the Fairtrade 
standards were not available 
for bananas 
Jordans—Conservation grade DiVerentiation, responding to 
speciWc preference of consumers
Organic label not feasible1 C
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RFA, and Bonduelle—are roughly equal. GreenWelds has adopted the lowest agrobiodiversity
performance standards. Regarding the procedural requirements for reliability, the middle
bracket consists of Oké, RFA, and GreenWelds. Arrangements are made to distribute
responsibilities among independent third parties, and there are various guarantees of
compliance with the labeling schemes. However, environmental performance is not
systematically audited. Bonduelle, the only endogenous eco-label, trails behind the rest. It
does not arrange for independent audits. Nor does it compensate for this lack of objectivity
by conducting its own inspections. Thus, there is no subsequent feedback loop for the sake
of setting standards for the labeling scheme.
This study shows that it is in principle possible for food producers to regulate a public
good, speciWcally agrobiodiversity, through industry self-regulation and to integrate that good
in the food supply chain. Apart from the Wnding that eco-labels are not reliable for all stages,
the study also reveals that their capacity to reduce the information asymmetry between the
seller and the consumer is very limited. This is also clear from the reasons that multinationals
give for choosing to operate under an eco-label of their own rather than one from an existing
labeling family. Their rationale is not that they want to provide the consumer with better
information, and that their own label can do that best. Rather, they believe that for marketing
reasons a company needs a way to distinguish itself from its competitors. Thus, they argue,
companies have to be able to put a label of their own on their entire product range.
It seems that their main objective is not to reduce the information asymmetry by inform-
ing consumers about their products. Actually, the information they provide is context-
speciWc in a sense that it is geared entirely to a producer with a certain knowledge level,
understanding of and experience with production processes. It is not directed at the con-
sumer in the shop at all, who is the end-user of the product. Consumers are left in the dark
about how the environmental eVects of one eco-label compare to those of another, as they
do not have information about the entire production-process of suppliers.
It remains to be seen if eco-labels are really so suitable as instruments of governance for
the conservation and sustainable use of agrobiodiversity. After all, the results of the prod-
uct-speciWc eco-labels and the reliability weaknesses are comparable to the weaknesses of
eco-labels of international labeling families (Van Amstel et al. 2006). And if so, it is
unclear just how eco-labels might be made more robust and by whom.
In our opinion, the strength of the eco-labels lies in their capacity to translate an abstract
notion like biodiversity into terms relevant to a speciWc supply chain. Their great potential
lies in the possibility to take concrete measures through that chain to stimulate agrobiodi-
versity. In that regard, eco-labels would seem to have a reasonable chance of success within
a chain and through business-to-business communication, at least if we can assume that
eco-labels are reliable. This does not mean, however, that the eco-label is also a suitable
means to resolve the problem of information asymmetry between the producer and the con-
sumer. Meanwhile, the eco-labels are not making any mutually comparable information
about environmental impact available to consumers. Until they do, these instruments will
not be up to the task of reducing information asymmetry.
In order to improve the quality of eco-labels, governments would have to set standards
for labels. Preferably, this would occur at the level of the European Union, for the sake of a
broad, level playing Weld and to assure equality and interchangeability among the Member
States. Those standards should ensure that two conditions are met. First, in general, there
must be transparency on compliance with the labeling schemes. For instance, annual
reports should be published giving Wgures for audits carried out, enumerating the violations
found, sanctions imposed, and cases taken to court. This information is currently published1 C
Biodivers Conserv (2007) 16:4109–4129 4127for the organic labels under EU regulation. Second, and more speciWcally, eVorts should
focus on monitoring the environmental impact and on putting together mutually compara-
ble information on these eVects for consumers. From a legal standpoint, this would entail
deWning the concept of the eco-label in terms of regulation. That means reserving usage of
the word by giving it trademark status and setting a few criteria for its application. Before
any such steps could be taken in a real social context, however, some obstacles would have
to be overcome. In the present situation, the parties oVering business-to-business eco-labels
for consumer products do not seem to have any interest in making labels mutually compa-
rable, nor in focusing on a label’s environmental impact.
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